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ABSTRACT: From mid-2015 to early 2016, more than a million refugees and migrants arrived in Europe, 
after having crossed the Mediterranean Sea. Sweden quickly emerged as one of the main destinations 
they aspired to reach. During the so-called refugee crisis of 2015–2016, the city of Malmö became the 
management center for the reception of refugees. In this context, a series of interplays emerged 
between governmental institutions (GIs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and social movement 
organizations (SMOs) involved in helping the refugees. Looking at the refugee crisis in Malmö through 
the lens of an interactionist approach to contentious politics, this article analyzes the strategic interplay 
between SMOs, NGOs, and GIs in the different phases of the crisis, as well as scrutinizes the conditions 
that facilitated or hindered cooperation among the actors. Results show that the crisis initially 
strengthened the role of SMOs, but that in order to enter into lasting and established forms of 
cooperation with NGOs and institutionalized politics, SMOs had to meet three conditions: 1) have a clear 
organizational structure, 2) downplay their political ideology, and 3) assume a complementary position 
to the other actors involved. For most SMOs, this limited their maneuverability, leading them to adopt 
one of three possible strategies: adapting to the new conditions, challenging the rules and players of the 
arena, or exiting the arena altogether.  
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1. Introduction  
 
From mid-2015 to early 2016, more than a million refugees and migrants arrived in 
Europe, after having crossed the Mediterranean Sea. While Italy and Greece were the 
primary points of entry into the European Union, most migrants sought to travel 
onward to countries with more welcoming asylum systems and labor markets. In this 
context, Sweden quickly emerged as one of the main destinations they aspired to 
reach.  
During the fall and winter of 2015, Sweden experienced the largest per-capita 
inflow of asylum seekers ever recorded in an OECD (Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development) country (Fratzke 2017; Malmö Stad 2016). About 
12,000 people applied for asylum in Sweden in August 2015, 24,000 in September, 
39,000 in October, and 37,000 in November. During these months up to 2,000 people 
arrived in the country every day, including unregistered refugees traveling on to 
other Nordic countries (Ghita 2016; Tanner 2016; Hansen 2018). Sweden alone 
received more than half of the total number of unaccompanied minors coming to the 
European Union, and in total, nearly 163,000 asylum applications were filed in 2015 
(Fratzke 2017; Malmö Stad; Tanner 2016).  
Most asylum seekers entered Sweden from Denmark through the city of Malmö. 
The city, which is located in the southern part of the country and connected to 
continental Europe by a bridge crossing The Sound, was the natural entry point and 
became the management center of the refugee crisis. This influx took both local and 
national authorities, as well as large parts of civil society, by surprise and required a 
plethora of actors to attend to the acute situation.  
The case of Malmö was not an isolated incident. Rather, it resembled similar 
developments in several European cities at the time (della Porta 2018; Hamann and 
Karakayali 2016). The dramatic increase in international migration flows to Europe in 
2015 has been referred to as “the long summer of migration” (della Porta 2018a, 2). 
In 2015, several countries, regions, and cities in Europe were faced with the 
challenges of large-scale migratory movements. As noted by Rucht (2018), 
opportunities for mobilization for and against migrants existed throughout Europe, 
following the “informal suspension of EU, national and local rule for dealing with 
asylum seekers and refugees [and] the heavy strain on EU, national and local 
administration facing the influx of refugees” (214). The situation has also attracted a 
great deal of scholarly attention and a flourishing of analysis on how European states 
and different types of actors responded to these developments (Ataç, Rygiel, and 
Maurice 2016; della Porta 2018a; Pries 2018; Rosenberger, Stern, and Merhaut 2018).  
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What makes the case of Malmö important, both empirically and theoretically, is 
the acute strain created by the situation in 2015–16 (Hansen 2018). In addition to the 
increase in the number of refugees, Sweden was not only country of passage, but also 
a country of destination. Although some unregistered refugees travelled on to other 
Nordic countries, most hoped to stay in Sweden. This created challenges concerning 
the management of their welcome, as well their integration into society (della Porta 
2018a). Moreover, it must be considered that not having experienced a large-scale 
migratory flow since the Balkan wars in the early 1990s, Swedish civil society and 
Swedish governmental institutions (GIs) were unprepared to handle the situation 
(Ghita 2016). 
In this article, the acute strain experienced during the autumn of 2015 is 
conceptualized as an exogenous shock, in which a sudden and significant change in 
external conditions sent ripples through large segments of Swedish society (Collier 
and Munck 2017; della Porta 2018b). The exogenous shock was embodied in the 
sudden arrival of thousands of migrants in Malmö. In the short term, it reinvigorated 
civil society and led to a dramatic increase in solidarity work for and with migrants. A 
series of projects concerning the provision of goods and services were developed. For 
instance, mobilization increased and new networks emerged, such as various 
welcome initiatives (Kleres 2018; Turunen and Weinryb 2019). In addition, 
established social movement organizations (SMOs) and established non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) within civil society increased their activities to 
address the acute situation. Alongside GIs, they worked to provide refugees with 
food, medicine, clothes, legal support, accommodation, and practical advice. In the 
immediacy of the crisis, the necessity to provide refugees with basic needs both 
forced and allowed a deviation from the standard ways of operating, fostering new 
opportunities, both formal and informal, for interplay between SMOs, NGOs, and GIs 
(Verhoeven and Bröer 2015).1 In the long term, some of these practices led to the 
creation of lasting ties among these groups, while at other times resulting in open 
conflict and rupture among the actors. More generally, the crisis contributed to a 
deepened debate and polarization between those for and those against generous 
migration policies, as well as significant policy changes in the areas of migration and 
immigration, leading to more restrictive migration policies. 
In hindsight, we have come to understand the exogenous shock of 2015–16 as a 
catalyst of a “critical juncture” (della Porta 2018a). Originally coined by Lipset and 
 
1 In this article, the concepts of “interplay” and “interaction” refer to the relationships that developed among the 
players. We use “cooperation” when referring to concrete collaborative ventures that emerged from their 
interactions.  
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Rokkan (1967), the concept has been widely applied to demarcate periods of 
institutional challenge and change and times of stability and continuity (della Porta 
2018b). Drawing on Robert (2015), we see how the refugee situation of 2015–16 
constituted a “crisis or strain that existing policies and institutions [were] ill-suited to 
resolve” (44). The political and institutional changes that followed were often marked 
by the characteristics of a critical juncture: They were 1) abrupt, as marked by 
decisive choice points, 2) discontinuous, in that the changes represented a significant 
break with established patterns, and c) path dependent, in that they created new 
political and institutional legacies that shaped and constrained future political 
developments (Roberts 2015). Consequently, the shock ignited a period of 
uncertainty, political polarization, and contingency but also created opportunities for 
interplay, collaboration, and innovation. The critical period allowed for a questioning 
and renegotiation of positions, rules, logics, and power relations governing the issue 
at hand. Initially, the shock and uncertainty of the situation created a substantial 
degree of freedom in actors’ choices and political agency (Capoccia 2015; Collier and 
Munck 2017; Verhoeven and Bröer 2015).  
The analysis of the refugee crisis in Malmö makes it possible to study the 
emergence of new formal and informal opportunities and practices of interplay 
between SMOs, NGOs, and GIs, as well as the factors that facilitated or hindered 
these interactive processes. The case also allows us to study the complexity of this 
interaction and illustrates how the generalized concepts of “social movements” and 
“the state” consist of a complex cluster of players. Instead of emphasizing 
antagonism between movements and institutionalized politics, our analysis aims at 
scrutinizing how various GIs interacted with segments of a social movement and at 
highlighting under what circumstances, with whom, and by what means this 
interaction came about.  
This article proceeds with a presentation of the theoretical perspective and 
concepts used, as well as a description of the specificities of studying interactive 
processes in a national context marked by a corporatist and consensus-oriented 
political culture such as Sweden. This is followed by a description of the events of the 
refugee situation in Malmö with particular attention being paid to the phases of the 
crisis and to the actors involved. The following paragraphs are dedicated to the 
analysis of the data, which is guided by two main research questions: A) What forms 
of interplay between SMOs, NGOs, and GIs emerged during the refugee crisis? B) 
What conditions facilitated or hindered the interplay between SMOs, NGOs, and GIs? 
Considering the interplay among these different actors, but still placing SMOs at 
the center of our analytical attention, we shed light on the conditions necessary for 
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the establishment and maintenance of relationships between SMOs, NGOs, and GIs. 
Results show that the crisis initially strengthened the role of SMOs in Malmö’s public 
scene but that in order to enter into formal cooperation with NGOs and actors within 
institutionalized politics, SMOs had to meet certain conditions. In particular, in order 
to be considered as potential partners, SMOs needed to 1) have a clear organizational 
structure, 2) downplay or abandon their political ideology, and 3) assume a 
complementary and ancillary role to the other actors. These criteria narrowed the 
space in which SMOs could maneuver and, in the end, hindered possibilities of 
developing lasting connections once the crisis began to fade. As a result, SMOs 
adopted one of three different ways of responding to the conditions set by GIs and 
NGOs: adapting, exiting, and challenging the rules and players in the arena.  
 
  
2. Reading the refugee crisis through an interactionist approach 
 
Social movement studies have seen an upsurge in research focusing on the 
dynamic interplay among movements and the many actors with whom activists 
interact. Recent works have contributed perspectives, tools, and concepts to trace 
and describe how, why, and where strategic interactions take place, as well as how 
different actors are affected by the interplay (e.g. Duyvendak and Jasper 2015; 
Fligstein and McAdam 2012; Jasper 2004; McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001). 
Our starting point for this article is the perspectives and concepts developed 
within the interactionist approach to contentious politics, particularly by Duyvendak 
and Jasper (2015). The approach focuses on the ways in which political protestors 
strategically interact with a multitude of actors in a continual dynamic process, and 
the contexts in which this interaction takes place. In relation to previous research 
that has positioned social movements front and center of analysis, the interactionist 
perspective emphasizes the relevance of all actors involved in the interplay. In doing 
so, the approach moves beyond the perception of the state as a monolithic entity 
and, instead, highlights the plurality of state and non-state players involved in the 
interaction. Moreover, it seeks to study how and why they engage with each other in 
different contexts.  
To disengage from the movement-centered vocabulary of previous research, 
Duyvendak and Jasper (2015) offer the terms “players” and “arenas,” which we use in 
this article. According to the authors, players can be simple (i.e. individual) or 
compound (i.e. collective) actors “who engage in strategic interaction with some goal 
in mind” (10). Players are bound together by a collective identity and have a variety 
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of capacities at their disposal to pursue their goals. During the course of interaction, 
different players cooperate with, constrain, or conflict with each other and the main 
external constraints experienced by one player are the result of the actions of other 
players who have different goals and interests. 
To analyze the interplay surrounding the refugee crisis in Malmö, research needs 
to begin with an in-depth analysis of the players involved. In this case, the number of 
players were multitudinous. In addition to individuals spontaneously participating in 
collective actions, the players included radical and moderate SMOs, established 
NGOs, religious organizations, various GIs (such as local governments, political 
parties, and the police), as well as individual politicians and civil servants. The 
interactionist approach encourages us to scrutinize the origin, nature, and goals of 
dominant players; how they operate; the means they use to pursue their goals, and 
the logics that make the players seek or refuse interaction with each other. 
The concept of “arena” refers to the spatial-temporal context “where politics 
occur,” (Jasper 2015, 14) or, in Wolin’s (1960) terms, “where the plans, ambitions, 
and actions of individuals and groups incessantly jar against each other – colliding, 
blocking, coalescing, separating” (15). Not necessarily connected to a physical place, 
an arena is held together by formal and informal rules and resources, which allow 
certain types of interaction to take place. Arenas are constructed and reconstructed 
through the actions of players, and in most cases also take manifest forms so that one 
can actually watch the interaction taking place (Jasper 2015). 
The refugee crisis of 2015–16 in Malmö and the contention surrounding asylum 
politics at the time can be seen as a new arena – a space for increased interaction 
among a wide range of players. Nowhere in Sweden did this take a more concrete 
form than at the Central Station in Malmö, a physical place where the interaction 
became manifest. Using the 2015–16 events in Malmö as a case study, we are able to 
study the dynamics of interaction: the tensions, collaborations, and conflicts that 
occurred; players’ representations of other actors; the opportunities for and 
challenges of interplay; and the gains and losses players experienced. 
 
 
3. Specificities of the Swedish context 
 
What makes Sweden particularly interesting for analyzing interactive dynamics 
between social movements and institutionalized politics is the socio-institutional 
context in which this interplay came about. In Sweden, relations between the state 
and civil society have for long been marked by what has been referred to as “the 
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Swedish model.” Primarily used to describe the political regulation of state-market 
relations and the political vision of a folkhem (the people’s home), the model also 
entails consensus-oriented and corporatist state-civil society relations, fostered by a 
persistent dominance of social democracy in political institutions and the labor 
movement (Peterson, Thörn and Wahlström 2018). During its forty-four years of 
uninterrupted government (1932–1976), the Social Democratic Party identified with 
and developed strong and active ties to the dominant social movements of the time, 
often referred to as popular movements (folkrörelser). This meant institutionalizing 
procedures for consulting and negotiating with movement representatives, recruiting 
movement leaders to government, funding movement groups and aiding in creating 
an infrastructure in which movements could operate. The inclusive, corporatist 
strategy of politicians and bureaucrats led to a political culture of consensus, 
characterized by negotiation, dialogue, and compromise, rather than a contentious 
and violent protest culture. For much of the 1900s, civil society tended to see itself, 
and to be seen, as a partner, rather than a challenger to the state (Jørgensen 2008; 
Micheletti 1995; Peterson et al. 2018; Lundberg 2011; Turunen and Weinryb 2019). 
Much has changed in the last decades. Since the 1980s, the Swedish model has 
been partially dismantled and transformed, in part, due to the consequences of 
neoliberal reforms influencing both social democratic and center-right governments. 
This has meant an overall system shift and a turn towards more “market-oriented 
solutions,” leading to increased partnerships between GIs and economic actors rather 
than civic ones (Larsson, Letell and Thörn 2012; Peterson et al. 2018). The consensus 
culture in Sweden has also been challenged: more contentious forms of protests have 
been introduced into social movements’ repertoires of action, as well as new laws, 
restrictions, and repressive practices enacted, designed to govern domestic dissent 
(Jämte and Sörbom 2016; Wahlström 2011; Wennerhag 2017). In sum, the traditional 
Swedish model for state-civil society has been weakened but is still prevalent. For 
instance, it can be noted in the institutionalized connections between civil society 
and state actors, in funding and infrastructure, as well as on the municipal level, 
where interaction between civil society and institutionalized politics is often close. 
While the corporatist structures and the consensus-oriented political culture 
characterizing Sweden foster opportunities for civic actors close to institutionalized 
politics, they have created constrains and limitations for others (Jämte and Sörbom 
2016; Lundberg 2011). Jämte (2013) provides a preliminary insight into how activists 
during anti-racist mobilizations experienced their relatively close connection to state 
actors. Studying the anti-racist movement in Sweden from 1980 to 2005, he shows 
how different segments of the movement have experienced interactions with actors 
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from institutionalized politics, such as political parties. On the one hand, radical 
activists were often skeptical or hostile to any interplay, describing the state as a 
threat that sought to marginalize, stigmatize, and repress the radical segments of the 
movement. On the other hand, more moderate groups saw close collaboration with 
governmental institutions as necessary in order to achieve societal change. This said, 
moderates also described negative experiences of co-optation and state attempts to 
compete with and marginalize critical segments of the movement. Our case study 
makes it possible to deepen this earlier study and to interpret previous findings in 
light of politicians’ and civil servants’ representations of interaction. 
 
 
4. The refugee crisis in Malmö as a case study: Phases and players  
  
Identifying the refugee crisis of 2015–16 in Malmö as an arena, we can follow the 
interactive processes and study what happens when different players in this arena 
interact over time. Although obviously simplifying a non-linear and dynamic 
development, we have divided the episode into three phases. Each phase highlights 
major shifts that occurred in the arena as a result of the interaction among different 
players, their capabilities, and their goals. By doing so, we acknowledge that “social 
events don’t happen all at once, but rather happen in steps: first one thing, then 
another, with each succeeding step creating new conditions under which all the 
people and organizations involved must now negotiate the next step” (McCall and 
Becker 1990, 6). 
 
The gradual change of the arena: Three phases 
 
From the very beginning of the arrivals of refugees in late August 2015, Malmö 
Central Station became the main theatre for the emerging refugee situation. Prior to 
GIs clearly establishing their presence at the station, civic actors had already stepped 
in. The first phase was characterized by the deep involvement of SMOs and NGOs in 
providing migrants with accommodation, food, clothing, legal and bureaucratic 
support, practical advice, as well as the coordination of the many people who showed 
up at Malmö Central Station to volunteer. In this stage, informal welcome initiatives 
became the face of civil society’s response to the crisis. These welcome initiatives 
emerged partially from the action of “entirely new organizations typically mobilized 
through social media” (Kleres 2018, 2), and partially from a shift in the focus of 
existing SMOs. Consequently, during the first phase, the arrivals were largely assisted 
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by volunteers and activists in emerging informal groups, such as Refugee Welcome, 
local SMOs belonging to the radical left, or established NGOs (i.e. Save the Children, 
Red Cross) (Turunen and Weinryb 2019). 
The second phase was characterized by the increased involvement of GIs that 
gradually established their presence at Malmö Central Station. In October 2015, a 
temporary transit area was opened outside the station to provide refugees with 
information, food, and clothes, as well as to ease the procedure of identity checking 
in collaboration with the national migration agency. Temporary accommodations 
were set up in public buildings around the city (i.e. schools and gyms), and local 
services (i.e. hospitals and social services) were involved in providing basic health and 
social support. During this phase, several projects targeting refugees were initiated in 
collaboration by actors from institutionalized politics and civil society, as will be 
discussed in more detail later. 
The third and final phase marked the beginning of the end of the intensified 
mobilization. It started after the crisis peaked, when the shared sense of uncertainty 
and crisis among the players had begun to fade. This phase roughly began with the 
implementation of restrictive migrations policies and the removal of the temporary 
transit area outside Malmö Central Station, in late November 2015. At this point, the 
management of the situation was progressively integrated into the “standard” 
institutional services. During this phase, the needs of refugees were mainly handled 
through existing structures and procedures of local and national Swedish welfare 
systems. This said, actors within civil society continued to carry out autonomous 
initiatives aimed at facilitating refugees’ integration into the city. In the aftermath of 
the crisis, NGOs and SMOs developed specific projects targeting refugees’ needs, 
such as afterschool programs for refugee children, popular canteen and food banks, 
overnight shelters, and temporary accommodations. 
During the second and third phases, some SMOs were invited to collaborate with 
GIs and NGOs within the temporary transit area or in other types of projects aimed at 
managing the crisis, while other SMOs were not involved or refused to cooperate 
with them. In the analytical section, we analyze in detail the emerging dynamics and 
practices of interplay among these actors, as well as the factors that facilitated or 
hindered the interaction among them. Before that, we turn to a more detailed 
presentation of the players involved.   
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Cataloguing the players  
 
As pointed out by Jasper (2015), in order “to understand how protest arises, 
unfolds, and affects (or does not affect) the world around it, research needs to begin 
with catalogs of the players involved on all sides” (13). In this article, the catalogue 
Jasper calls for comprises three main types of actors that engaged in the provision of 
humanitarian help and services to the newly arrived migrants: GIs, NGOs, and SMOs. 
The main responsibilities of the GIs were shared by Migrationsverket (the Swedish 
migration agency), Region Skåne (Skåne Regional Council), and Malmö Stad (Malmö 
Municipality). Region Skåne mainly had a coordinating role aimed at guaranteeing 
equal standards in the provision of services in the regional area where Malmö is 
located. Migrationsverket and Malmö Stad were both responsible for organizing the 
reception of migrants. Migrationsverket’s main responsibility was the coordination of 
reception, identity checks, and dispersion of the migrants throughout the country. 
Malmö Stad took responsibility for the humanitarian reception of refugees, 
establishing the transit area at Malmö Central Station, opening public shelters and, 
later, promoting the social inclusion of refugees and unaccompanied minors through 
their services. 
Both international and local NGOs played an active role in the management of the 
refugee situation. Prominent NGOs were Red Cross, Save the Children, and Skåne 
Stadsmission (Skåne City Mission), but religious organizations were also heavily 
involved.2 While Red Cross and Save the Children are well-known international NGOs, 
Skåne City Mission is a regional organization working on homelessness and social 
exclusion.  
Six SMOs emerged as important in the management of the crisis: Refugees 
Welcome to Malmö, Refugees Welcome Malmö,3 Kontrapunkt (Counterpoint), Allt Åt 
Alla (Everything to Everyone), and Asylgruppen (The Asylum Group). It is not possible 
to detail the characteristics of each of these players in this article, but it is important 
to note that they had different starting points for their assistance and that their 
histories differed. Refugees Welcome to Malmö and Refugees Welcome Malmö did 
not exist before the crisis: they developed as informal apolitical welcome initiatives in 
direct response to the arrival of refugees. Asylgruppen, Kontrapunkt, and Allt Åt Alla 
 
2 Religious organizations played a crucial role in the provision of services to refugees during and after the crisis. The 
exclusion of these groups from the analysis does not dismiss their importance. We made several attempts to conduct 
interviews with representatives of local churches and mosques but were unable to involve them in the research. Since 
this article seeks to give equal attention to the different players in the arena, we felt we could not tell their stories 
without having heard their perspectives.    
3 Refugees Welcome to Malmö and Refugees Welcome Malmö are two different SMOs.   
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were preexisting grassroots left-leaning groups. Asylgruppen i Malmö is an 
organization active since the early 1990s. It shares a critical perspective on the 
Swedish migration system and has specialized in helping asylum seekers and 
paperless migrants. Allt Åt Alla Malmö is a well-established, radical-left libertarian 
SMO involved in a wide range of civic and political activities, including advocating for 
migrants’ rights. Kontrapunkt is a former “artistic hub” that during and after the crisis 
turned into a welcome center for migrants and people in need. 
 
 
5. Data and methods 
 
The narrative material on which this article is based was collected through semi-
structured interviews with twenty individuals. We interviewed twelve activists from 
the SMOs engaged in helping refugees (Refugees Welcome to Malmö, Refugees 
Welcome Malmö, Kontrapunkt, Allt Åt Alla, and Asylgruppen). We also interviewed 
four representatives of the aforementioned NGOs (Red Cross, Save the Children, and 
Skåne City Mission). Lastly, interviews were conducted with four representatives of 
local GIs responsible for implementing institutional actions targeting refugees 
(Malmö Stad and Region Skåne).  
The first interviewees were selected on the basis of previous research in the field 
and through an analysis of various document materials (i.e. research reports, 
newspapers, social media). Snowball sampling technique was used to identify further 
interviewees, and we applied a saturation criterion to determine when we had 
carried out an adequate number of interviews. The difference in the number of 
representatives of SMOS, NGOs and GIs is due to three main reasons. First, the 
number of involved SMOs was greater than that of NGOs and GIs, and the horizontal 
structure of most SMOs made it important to interview several people from each 
group. Second, our contacts in SMOs directed us to other key activists, while 
representatives from GIs and NGOs provided us with fewer colleagues to interview. 
Third, some people with prominent roles in GIs and NGOs during the crisis had 
changed jobs or location and were impossible to reach, while most SMO’s key 
activists did not change from 2015 to 2018. All things considered, we have managed 
to interview key persons for each player, making it possible to reconstruct the 
different phases of the crisis, and scrutinize the logics that made the players seek or 
refuse interaction with each other. 
The interviews focused on the roles, goals, and strategies of the SMOs, NGOs, and 
GIs and on the interviewees’ views on the processual development of the arena. We 
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also asked interviewees about their view of other actors, obstacles to and possibilities 
for interplay, and the gains and losses experienced because of these interactive 
processes. 
Interviews were conducted in English and were, on average, 1.5 hours long, 
providing thick material on the actors’ perspectives of their interplay. In order to 
safeguard interviewees’ privacy, their names have been omitted or changed.  
The interviews were conducted in November and December 2018, approximately 
three years after the peak of the refugee crisis. This delay resulted in some particular 
challenges: some of the most active actors during the 2015 crisis were no longer in 
Malmö or even in Sweden, some had switched roles (from civil servant to activist or 
vice versa), and some had difficulty recollecting the events of 2015. However, this 
methodological choice was still preferred, as it allowed us to collect original material 
on the actors’ perceptions and experiences of the interplay among groups, which 
both influenced their actions and willingness to interact with other actors.  
 
 
6. The refugee crisis as an emerging arena of interaction 
 
As stated above, the situation in Malmö in 2015–16 created specific conditions for 
the interplay between SMOs, NGOs, and GIs, arising from the combination of the 
critical moment, the collaborative and consensus-oriented culture of state-civil 
society relations, and the well-developed Swedish welfare system. Our analysis 
underlines that critical moments open possibilities for interaction because authorities 
are caught unaware, but also that civil society’s ability to maneuver can be limited 
when authorities are efficient in providing solutions (as in the Malmö case). 
During the intensified mobilization in Malmö, both these tendencies emerged and 
defined a combination of opportunities and constraints for SMOs, whose room to 
maneuver was determined not so much “by economic and political structures” as it 
was “imposed by other players with different goals and interests” (Jasper 2015, 9). 
In the immediacy of the crisis, local authorities and local services found 
themselves unprepared. Several civil servants we interviewed underlined the 
unpredictability of the refugee crisis. A former employee of Malmö Stad described 
the crisis as a sort of tsunami, with only a few drops of rain providing a warning. 
 
Something is happening, but we didn’t really know what. […] It was like a snowball 
effect. First there were a few drops, and then there are more drops […] and then […] 
we had like a flood gate opening. We went from five kids a night to ten kids a night, to 
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twenty kids a night. And when the largest influx, I think we had over a hundred children 
arriving in Malmö in one night. We had to scale up social services around the clock and 
start a whole new unit. 
 
A similar narrative of the situation was provided by several NGO representatives, 
who also described the crisis as a sudden and unexpected emergency nobody could 
have foreseen. Despite the general goals and mission of these organizations to tackle 
humanitarian emergencies, Swedish NGOs had seldom, if ever, experienced an 
emergency of this magnitude in their “backyard.” Specializing in fundraising and 
advocacy, some NGOs discovered they lacked the necessary competencies and skills 
to deal with the immediacy of the situation. An interviewee from Save the Children 
underlined how the crisis came as a shock: 
 
We don’t have this experience of seeing humanitarian crisis so close to us in 
Sweden. We work very much [on this] at the international level with different 
methods, but it was the first time in Sweden that we realized that we needed to work 
more directly with the people. […] It was really fast, because it was an emergency. It 
was like this feeling of emergency that we had never experienced in Save the Children 
in Sweden. It was really special and big. 
 
While GI and NGO actors mostly described being unprepared for the arrival of 
refugees, several SMO interviewees described a relative readiness. Thanks to their 
grassroots and international networks, they knew a few days in advance about the 
movement of refugees from continental Europe to the Nordic countries. Moreover, 
SMOs’ experience of quickly organizing events and mobilizing people into action 
became a resource when the emergency erupted. As one SMO representative said:  
 
The news of refugees walking on the highway in Denmark reached us and some 
people started calling around. […] “They are coming to Sweden, so they are going to 
arrive, and there’s a lot of people, they are going to arrive late in the night. They will 
need a place to sleep. Could you do that?” So we basically gathered, had a fifteen-
minute discussion and decided “yes, let’s do it.” […] And we already had gathered a lot 
of mattresses and a lot of things so we could easily do it, but we also made a call on 
Facebook and then people started donating. And we had an organization which was 
quite skilled and well trained in running events […] big events with thousands of people 
and stuff. We had an organization that knew how to [deal with] logistics, security, food, 
volunteers, schedules, communication. In a few days we managed to adapt [our space] 
to housing instead of events.  
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In the critical moment of the emerging crisis, the absence of GIs and NGOs created 
a need and opportunity for the development of different types of welcome initiatives. 
To a large extent, these involved citizens who had not previously participated in 
SMOs but who wanted to help. For instance, the crisis fostered the birth of Refugee 
Welcome to Malmö and, more generally, activated loosely organized networks and 
informal groups of local residents (Kleres 2018; Turunen and Weinryb 2019). Asked to 
explain how Refugee Welcome to Malmö was born, a former volunteer of the 
organization stressed the spontaneity involved:  
 
The whole thing originated from Sara [a pseudonym]. She has a lot of connections in 
Europe to other organizations and was getting text messages and Facebook messages 
about a lot of refugees on their way to Malmö by train, and that they needed food and 
clothes when they arrived. She gathered some friends and food and clothes and went 
down to meet them. And because there was such a big need of food and clothes, she 
kept sending out messages on Facebook, which a lot of people replied to. So first there 
were five ladies down there, and suddenly there were hundred, and two hundred of us 
down there.  
 
Our analysis suggests that the immediacy of the crisis created opportunities for 
SMOs and informal networks to advance their position in the arena. Due to their 
organizational culture (self-organization, self-management, and an activist do-it-
yourself mentality), they were able to quickly maneuver and fill the space in the 
absence and unpreparedness of GIs and established NGOs. Their readiness to provide 
direct help to the refugees empowered local SMOs as players in the arena. Indeed, 
several SMOs experienced rapid growth in their numbers, gained more visibility, and 
obtained greater recognition among local inhabitants (Weinryb 2015). As put by one 
activist:  
 
[During the crisis] we kind of tweaked our organization, and basically it boomed, of 
course, with all the volunteers and people who wanted to help and donate […]. We had 
a 24/7 organization running for six months. 
 
Our analysis also shows how the immediate involvement of SMOs produced 
openings for interplay between SMOs, NGOs, and GIs. The dialogue among these 
groups emerged as a strategic choice for all the actors involved. When local and 
national GIs and NGOs arrived at Malmö Central Station to provide services to 
refugees, they arrived in an arena already occupied by “cumbersome” players. SMOs 
were already meeting refugees’ basic needs through their own initiatives and 
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networks, and they demonstrated capabilities and strengths that could not be easily 
ignored or dismissed by the other players. In particular, the GIs’ and NGOs’ need for 
volunteers seem to have made it necessary for them to engage in a dialogue with 
SMOs. In the critical moment of the crisis, local inhabitants’ and activists’ willingness 
to provide time, energy, and goods around the clock—a resource that was mostly 
mobilized and organized by SMOs—represented a pivotal resource for the 
management of the emergency. One of the activists summarized SMOs’ strengths as 
follows: 
 
Institutions didn’t have any capability. I mean, our capability is that we move very 
quickly. We are not a bureaucracy that needs to take into consideration how decisions 
are made. I mean, our ability to act under crisis is much greater than that of the 
municipality or the Swedish migration agency.  
 
Moreover, SMOs’ ability to bend formal rules and their willingness to engage in 
conflict with government authorities were seen as strategic resources by the NGOs, 
who were sometimes frustrated by their need to maintain a good relationship with 
GIs.  
 
[As an NGO] we are bounded to the organizational, […] not laws, but you know, we 
have a framework of what we can and what we cannot do. For example, we’re not 
supposed to give individual support to individuals. […] But [SMOs] can do whatever 
they want to do with money. They can really hand out money, but we cannot do that at 
all. It’s like “okay, you can do this, because we see this need, that we can support you 
in this, but you do the actual work in it.” 
 
In relation to the different types of resources connected to different players, SMOs 
controlled human capital (in the form of activists/volunteers) and had the needed 
organizational flexibility and broad repertoire of action that GIs and NGOs did not. 
However, NGOs and GIs had access to or control of important material assets (i.e. 
funds, spaces, and trained knowledgeable professionals, such as lawyers, interpreters 
and skilled social workers) that SMOs often lacked. These resources became 
increasingly important to assure the continuity of the players’ actions beyond the 
acute emergency.  
Our analysis highlights how none of the actors involved in the management of the 
refugee crisis in Malmö was completely self-sufficient. As a consequence, strategic 
interplays emerged as players attempted “to get others to do what [they] want[ed] 
them to” (Jasper 2015, 19; Verhoven and Bröer 2015). At the same time, the various 
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players critiqued each other. SMOs questioned the inadequacy, inefficiency, and 
inflexibility of the GIs and NGOs in that they were not always able to provide the 
direct help refugees needed and sometimes obstructed the attempts of SMOs to 
assist. GIs accused SMOs of stepping over boundaries and disregarding certain rules 
that safeguarded the refugees. They were also critiqued for taking on responsibilities 
without having the necessary expertise. Moreover, the fluid and undefined nature of 
SMOs was interpreted as a lack of long-term stability and of limited accountability. In 
sum, GI representatives tended to portray SMOs as an important resource that 
needed to be managed, coordinated, and contained in order not to become 
problematic. 
  
 
7. Opportunities for and challenges of interplay  
 
Between the first and second phases, the arena was gradually reconstructed. This 
happened through the strategic actions of different players, who tried to either take 
or maintain control of the management of the crisis. In particular, local GIs attempted 
to take control of the situation, while utilizing the resources of SMOs and NGOs. In 
practice, this occurred through the creation of new forums (i.e. formalized moments 
of dialogue and consultation) as well as a series of partnerships (formalized 
collaborations) between GIs and some of the other players in civil society. For 
instance, at the temporary transit area, some of the SMOs were invited to take part 
in consultations with GIs and NGOs. Also, some SMOs were asked to collaborate and 
continue to provide direct support to refugees while others were not. As recalled by 
one of the activists:  
 
We were invited into the [temporary transit area at Malmö Central Station]. […] I 
think we met twice a week, which sounds insane, but it was. This big group of people 
who were down at Malmö Central, basically. The Red Cross, Malmö municipality, the 
migration agency, Refugees Welcome and MSB [the Swedish Civil Contingencies 
Agency], which is like the authority for safety in Sweden […]. Anyone who in any way 
was involved had a big meeting twice a week, Tuesdays and Fridays, to [get an] update 
on the situation.  
 
On the one hand, the establishment of new forums and partnerships could be read 
as a victory on the part of SMOs, in that their presence and relevance were 
recognized. On the other hand, our analysis shows that SMOs were gradually 
curtailed. From our data, Swedish institutions emerge as slow, but efficient machines. 
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Following the initial turbulence, the creation of a temporary transit area at Malmö 
Central Station and the increasing controls at borders marked the beginning of a 
restructuring of the power relations within the arena, with local and national GIs 
gradually taking control of the management of the crisis. In the words of one of the 
interviewed activists: 
 
Local authorities and the Swedish migration agency were very disorganized at first. 
Even if they could have organized receiving people, they didn’t know what to do with 
them. They didn’t have any places to put them over the night. They couldn’t register 
them. They couldn’t feed them. There was nothing they could do. For the first two 
months, they were completely dependent on the volunteer organizations. Not that 
they wanted to say that they were, but they were, obviously and actually. But once the 
borders were closed and they managed to intercept all refugees they were able to 
control the situation. 
 
The GIs’ recovery of institutional control was possible through the strategic 
opening and closing of the aforementioned possibilities of cooperation. While 
prominent NGOs were often invited to participate in forums and partnerships, only 
some of the SMOs were. Our analysis suggests that three main factors conditioned 
the inclusion of SMOs in cooperative ventures: 1) the organizational structure of the 
SMOs, 2) the level of politicization of the SMOs, and 3) the complementarity between 
the tasks and strategies of actions of the SMOs and that of the other actors. 
 
The organizational structure of SMOs 
 
The organizational structure of the SMOs seems to have had a crucial importance 
in determining the extent of SMOs’ cooperation with GIs and NGOs. By organizational 
structure, interviewees from NGOs and GIs refer to the internal structure that 
allowed actors outside of the SMO to quickly identify persons with key functions and 
responsibilities. These individuals were also expected to act as guarantors for the 
fulfillment of each player’s obligations.  
Our analysis show that in order for cooperation with GIs to develop, SMOs had to  
from formally define their organizational structure. In general terms, SMOs were 
expected to organize like NGOs, that is, to put in place a clear organizational structure 
and definitive roles and responsibilities in relation to decision-making procedures. 
Consequently, the SMOs that the GIs directly cooperated with were those that, 
despite beginning as loose networks, formalized their organization by creating an 
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association and a clear internal structure. This is the case, for example, with Refugee 
Welcome to Malmö, that after regular coordination meetings with the GIs, created 
new regulations for their internal management (Turunen and Weinryb 2019). One of 
the activists recalled: 
 
We all gathered at Malmö Central Station and had our first meeting; the people who 
were then going to become the board of the organization, who basically identified that 
the administrative […] like, the structure […] we need to. [...] We closed down, people 
could no longer post in the Facebook group, so we could start having structured 
information, all of those things. […] And then, about a week after that, I suggested that 
we should form an organization. Because then we were just a group of people. […] We 
actually formed an organization, which was the reason for why we could later on start 
working with the municipality.  
 
The absence of a clear organizational structure also seems to have complicated 
the interactions between SMOs and NGOs. The development of dialogue and 
collaborative projects between SMOs and NGOs appeared to be dependent on 
identifying one or more leaders, even if informal ones, within the SMO. In this 
context, SMOs characterized by a more horizontal organizational structure struggled 
to communicate with the other players. One of the activists described the difficulties 
as follows:  
 
We had a very hard time cooperating because they have hierarchy in their 
organization, and we organize flat. […] It was a hard time […]. I think we have not 
reached a position where we can actually work together. I think that is a pity. I think it’s 
a huge problem for us as a movement, that we are not able to cooperate even with 
organizations that are so similar to us ideologically.  
 
The level of SMO politicization 
 
 The second condition that facilitated or hindered interplay concerned the level of 
politicization of the SMOs. In this case, the possibility for cooperation with GIs 
implied that the SMO wasn’t recognized for, or were prepared to abandon, their 
political positions. Being perceived as politicized, or radical, complicated interactions 
with GIs to the point of blocking emerging cooperation. This is illustrated by a 
Refugee Welcome Malmö activist, who recalled their interaction with a local 
municipality nearby Malmö: 
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We were going to apply for funding, and we had a really great dialogue with the 
people working in the municipality. They were really interested in doing this together 
with us. And they, they’d bring it to the politicians […]. Then they are like, “no, we can’t 
work together with them, because it’s a leftist organization.” And it’s so fascinating 
how everything that is about assisting someone or offering a little bit of support, all of 
a sudden becomes “left.” 
 
Our analysis shows that GIs would not collaborate with SMOs known for their 
radical politics and contentious approach, also excluding them from public 
recognition. A radical activist described this exclusion in relation to a public event 
organized by GIs ad NGOs:  
 
It was a big event […] in Malmö, the big square. And all the different parties were 
invited, and also some humanitarian groups. We were not invited, but [another SMO] 
was. I got the knowledge that this was going on, and I asked them if they were 
preparing a speech. They weren’t, so we made a suggestion that maybe we could do 
one together. Because we were prepared to make a speech, but we didn’t have the 
possibility, we weren’t invited. We kind of sneaked in through the other SMOs. […] We 
wrote it. 
 
Also with regards to cooperating with NGOs, SMOs mainly seem to have been 
accepted as collaborative partners if they left their political identity and position “at 
the door.” In these interactions too, “politics” was often understood as something 
that complicated things, created tensions, and hindered the practical goal of helping 
refugees. An NGO representative explained his position:  
 
For me, personally, it’s not a problem, because we often have the same agenda, and 
the agenda is to help the people that need help. And then we have our different 
reasons, or, like, backgrounds. […] For me, if we can focus on that [helping people], I 
can work with anyone. […] But we have to focus on that, and not the political agenda in 
any way. Because that may differ, obviously […]. Like, for example, if there’s a political 
agenda, we can’t do that together, but we can focus on the group of people that we  
need to help. 
 
The depoliticized nature of the initial mobilization has been noted in existing 
research on the refugee crisis in Sweden. According to Kleres (2018), much of the 
early mobilization was driven by moral shock, feelings of compassion, and the desire 
to uphold human dignity, rather than seen as political acts. This was supported by a 
general apolitical framing of the issues in public discourses, which both provided an 
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opportunity for and hindered interplay. As noted, for those players who agreed, 
accepted, or adapted to the apolitical framing of the situation, collaboration with 
NGOs and GIs was possible. At the same time, this made it harder for organizations 
and groups known for their political profile to cooperate.  
 
SMOs as complementary players 
 
The third factor affecting the possibilities for interplay concerns the 
complementary role of SMOs in relation to GIs and NGOs. In order for cooperation to 
take place, SMOs benefited from not being perceived as competitors or challengers 
by the other players in the arena.  
From the perspective of the GIs, “complementarity” meant that SMOs could be 
invited to participate as long as they held an ancillary position and did not disrupt the 
activities of the GIs. The empirical data indicate that GIs tended to close opportunities 
for interplay with SMOs that were so efficient and organized that they competed with 
institutional efforts, even if they had a largely collaboratively oriented approach, 
Kontrapunkt being a case in point. In the immediacy of the crisis, Kontrapunkt turned 
its headquarters into a shelter and provided refugees with accommodation and food, 
playing a pivotal role in the management of the emergency. All interviewees, except 
the GI representatives, acknowledged Kontrapunkt’s crucial role in the management 
of the crisis. One went as far as to question why their organization got public funding 
when Kontrapunkt did not: 
 
Four months after the crisis [when we were no longer active] we got a huge 
economical donation from Malmö Municipality. We were rather irritated by that 
because we thought Kontrapunkt should have had that money instead. Because of our 
own rules, we could not pass it on to Kontrapunkt. That was a tough situation because 
they really needed the money. […] And then stupid Malmö City gave it to us. 
 
The need for complementarity also emerged in the relationships between SMOs 
and NGOs. NGOs were more likely to engage in cooperation with SMOs than GIs, but 
due to competition because of similarities in practices, targets, and tasks, SMOs were 
often forced to accept an ancillary position or to abandon the cooperation. As one of 
the NGOs’ representatives, formerly engaged in one SMO, recalled:  
 
I’ve seen how the counter productivity between organizations is so bad. I was 
frustrated because it was impossible to work together on many things […], coming from 
a volunteer organization that nobody really listened to – we tried, but it was so hard. 
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[...] And I saw the bigger organizations, like “you should do this, but you didn’t do it.” 
[…] It was so frustrating. […] There was still some competition between the different 
organizations.   
 
The need for SMOs to take a complimentary position to facilitate cooperation with 
GIs has also been noted in existing research. Following the trajectory of Refugees 
Welcome to Malmö, Turunen and Weinryb (2019) describe a gradual co-optation of 
the organization, turning its mobilization from an effort to “challenge the state on a 
dignified reception of the refugees” to an organization “serving cinnamon buns, 
sandwiches, and fruit in tandem with the state” (13). In order to cooperate, the 
organization had to drop its autonomous supplementary position and align itself with 
the expectations and regulations of the state.  
 
Reshaping strategies 
 
Taken together, the three conditions narrowed the space in which SMOs could 
maneuver; they were allowed to cooperate in assisting refugees and received full 
recognition only under specific circumstances. In the reconstructed arena defined by 
the strategic action of the GIs, SMOs had to decide if they wanted to be “in” or “out.” 
As put by one of the activists:  
 
In the end, we heard that Malmö Municipality had a dinner to thank all the 
volunteers who helped with the refugee crisis. We heard it afterwards, we were not 
invited. […] But this is very typical of Malmö Municipality. […] You are in or you don’t 
exist. 
 
As a result, SMOs reshaped their strategies in relation to the changing conditions 
within the arena, opting for one of three approaches:  
1) Adapting – staying in the arena and adjusting to the rules for participation, as 
defined by the GIs. SMOs that opted for this approach underwent a process of 
institutionalization and normalization that, in the long run, allowed them to 
engage in long-term cooperation with GIs and NGOs. However, this approach also 
resulted in internal disputes, sometimes followed by members joining other SMOs 
and by a gradual decrease in activity.  
2) Exiting – abandoning the arena. After the initial stage of the crisis, some SMOs 
decided to avoid interaction with GIs and NGOs, focusing their energies on other 
issues and arenas. These SMOs stopped providing direct assistance to refugees, 
claiming that this was the duty of institutions, not civil society. In so doing, they 
Jämte and Pitti, Strategic Interplay in times of crisis 
 
431 
 
safeguarded their organizational structures, ideals, and positions from 
normalization and institutionalization, but they also entered into conflict with 
their members and other SMOs that interpreted their decision as an abandonment 
of the struggle and those in need.   
3) Challenging – continuing to provide services to refugees, but doing so 
autonomously, without interacting with GIs or NGOs. In this case, SMOs decided to 
“compete” with GIs, providing services for refugees by setting up alternative 
shelters, canteens, and helpdesks. By creating a parallel autonomous structure, 
the SMOs challenged the rules and conditions set by NGOs and GIs. In so doing, 
they became more prominent political actors in the city, mobilizing new adherents 
and constituents. However, the activists acknowledged that the decision to 
challenge GIs on this issue made cooperation in other areas more difficult. 
 
 
8. Conclusions  
 
Using the refugee crisis in Malmö as a case study, this article has shed light on the 
forms of and conditions for interplay between SMOs, NGOs, and GIs in times of 
experienced crisis and strain. By analyzing the strategic interaction among these 
players, we have identified under which conditions cooperation occurs and the 
different strategies developed by SMOs to handle the criteria for cooperation 
established by other players in the arena. By focusing on the processual, dynamic, 
and strategic elements of these interactions, we have contributed to the research on 
the interplay between SMOs, NGOs, and GIs. 
We have shown how the positions and roles of the different players were not set 
in stone, but rather, were the subject of constant readjustment. In the immediacy of 
the crisis, SMOs quickly took a central role by strategically deploying their skills and 
resources (i.e. flexibility, quickness of mobilization, do-it-yourself attitude). The 
gradual increase of NGO and GI involvement forced SMOs to re-adjust their 
strategies, re-think their roles and, in some cases, abandon the arena.  
Leaning on Jasper (2015), we show how “cooperation is a more common form of 
strategic interaction than conflict” (11) but that these two can also go hand in hand. 
By creating opportunities for interplay and strategically managing the opening and 
closing of possibilities for dialogue and collaboration, GIs changed the arena in their 
favor. The conditions set for cooperation in the reconstructed arena implicitly and 
explicitly made it difficult for several SMOs to participate. In the face of the 
conditions established for interplay by GIs, SMOs pursued various strategies, ranging 
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from adapting to exiting by creating parallel and competing structures. Established 
NGOs applied similar criteria for interplay. While more open to cooperation with 
SMOs, they too created conditions for interplay, which several SMOs found hard to 
adjust to. In line with previous research, the case of Malmö supports the assumption 
that in countries characterized by a corporatist and consensus-oriented political 
culture, more critical or radical SMOs have limited room to maneuver. While creating 
opportunities for SMOs willing to adapt to the conditions set by GIs and NGOs, others 
risk becoming the subject of exclusion or marginalization (Jämte and Sörbom 2016; 
Lundberg 2011; Turunen and Weinryb 2019).  
The necessity of reducing the complexity of the case (in terms of players, length of 
the period being studied, observable dynamics of interaction, etc.) has certainly 
resulted in a simplification of the interactions, motives, and logics that made it 
possible for some players to collaborate and others not. While this analysis has 
mainly focused on the interaction among compound (collective) players, future 
research would benefit from analyzing the influence of personal relationships, pre-
existing and emerging friendships, and hostilities among simple (individual) players 
on the dynamics of interplay. Moreover, while this article does not focus on the role 
of emotions in structuring the arena and the interplay, future analyses would also 
benefit from studying how feelings of compassion, guilt, rage, fear, etc. influenced 
the strategies of different players.    
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